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THIRTY-TWO REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH,
SLUMBER AND REAWAKENING OF THE
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
JACK NORDBY

1.

The phenomena of rebirth, regeneration and metamorphosis
hold a powerful and perennial appeal for us, stimuli of hope,
antidotes to despair. They are embedded in our culture: Rip
Van Winkle, Snow White, the Ugly Duckling, even Lazarus, to
move from the silly to the sublime. Institutions as well as individuals are known to revive-in the Renaissance an entire civilization. Consider the prevalence of the prefix re- in our language:
pages and pages of any dictionary are filled with verbs and nouns
so modified.
State constitutions, as Justice Simonett aptly suggests in his essay introducing the volume, are no longer wallflowers at the
dance ofjustice. 1 Once the timorous companions of their more
vivacious federal sister, they are emerging as co-equals and, in
some important respects, the more potent and fertile members
of the republic's sometimes contentious family; The Minnesota
Constitution has eastern cousins who are, in fact, senior to the
United States Constitution; she has her own personality and abilities, and she is coming-belatedly but rambunctiously-into a
robust maturity.

1. John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM.
Curiously, Justice Simonett and I came independently
upon the same metaphor. Slightly uncomfortable with gender terminology, I nevertheless decided it should be retained since it seems appropriate and certainly in no way
derogatory to view the Constitution as feminine. On the contrary, to see the most fundamental and supreme law thus is perhaps a suitable antidote to the male-dominant
presumptions that remain anachronistically prevalent in some quarteirs of our culture.
It is of some little historical interest that a candidate for governor of this state could say
in all seriousness that men are "genetically predisposed" to lead women, at a time when
the majority of our Supreme Court consists of women. Interview of Alan Quist by David
Brauer, Twin Cities Reader, April 6, 1994, p. 11.
MITCHELL L. REv. 227 (1994).
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2.
Judges and lawyers in the state courts of the late twentieth century are privileged to live during and participate in a constitutional renaissance, one of a handful of the most notable periods
of constitutional growth, a time of what might be called constitutional opportunity. The first of these, of course, was the founding,
just two centuries ago, that gave birth to the United States Constitution and those indispensable amendments properly known
as the Bill of Rights.2 Next, and hardly less significant, came the
early and often decisive struggles in the Marshall era over the
document's central silences and ambiguities regarding the allocation of power between the federal and state governments and
the "people," and between the branches of the federal government.' The civil war, and particularly the amendments that
came in its wake, purged the Constitution of its toxic tolerance
of slavery and, in the great first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, demanded that the states extend due process and
equal protection of the law to all.4 These magnificently vague
terms, however, as well as the power of the federal courts to dictate their import to recalcitrant and sometimes reactionary state
governments, wanted both definition and elaboration. The Warren Court met this challenge with considerable courage and success. But even as the federal judiciary undertook to extract
substantive and procedural detail from the Constitution's generalities, the state courts became quiescent, simply deferring to
and adopting the Supreme Court's pronouncements affecting
individual liberties.5 However, a conservative, anti-activist reaction settled in under the Burger and Rehnquist majorities, slowing, halting, or even in some cases reversing the more generous
2. See generally ALFRED H.

D. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITU(5th ed. 1976).
3. Id. at chs. 8-11. See also 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL
(1919) (providing a detailed analysis of the remarkable constitutional statesmanship of
John Marshall).
4. Among the literature on this period, special mention should be given to an
extraordinary study by DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE
IN AMERICAN LAw AND POLrrCs (1978). This book provides an exhaustive exploration of
both the roots and aftermath of the slavery controversy which, in its extreme divisions
among the states and regions of the country, is replete with lessons for the student of
Federalism and state constitutions.
5. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1147-48 (1985). This deference occurred
despite repeated reminders from the Supreme Court that state courts were free to provide rights beyond those mandated in the Federal Constitution. Id.
KELLY & WINFRED

TION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
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protectiveness of the Warren era.' And it is this withdrawal of
the federal judiciary from the active advancement of personal
rights that has created a climate in which the slumbering demigods that are the state constitutions could reawaken.
3.
In 1819, that annus mirabilis of constitutional construction,
John Marshall 7 observed in M'Culloch v. Maryland that in its nature a constitution can only mark great outlines and designate
important objects, while the "minor ingredients which compose
those objects [must] be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves."8 And, Marshall emphasized, "we must never forget,
that it is a constitutionwe are expounding."9
So too, state judges, and the lawyers who bring issues before
them, must remember that it is a state constitution we are expounding. It is a document of certain large outlines, of a certain
absoluteness of object, but with ample room for delineation of
the "ingredients" of the great commands. Insofar as individual
rights are concerned (nothing is ultimately more essential), we
are free to add to, but we may not subtract from, the "ingredients" of the federal recipe. For example, Justice Powell has
written:
In an age in which empirical study is increasingly relied upon
as a foundation for decisionmaking, one of the more obvious
merits of our federal system is the opportunity it affords each
State, if its people so choose, to become a "laboratory" and
to experiment
with a range of trial and procedural
0
alternatives.'
4.
We Americans-from the extreme left to the far right-tend
to worship the Federal Constitution rather instinctively. It is, af6. See Stanley Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERC.AN LAw: THE THIRD CENTURY 213,
216 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1976); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnationof State Courts, 36
Sw. L.J. 951 (1982).
7. In the months of February and March 1819, John Marshall delivered the opinions in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); and Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). For a discussion of the impact of those opinions, see generally
BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, at 168-339.
8. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
9. Id.
10. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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ter all, a nice piece of work as well as the supreme law of the
land.1 1 Nevertheless, lest we kneel too quickly and adore too uncritically, we should remember that, among other things, it embodied slavery. 12 It is not unpatriotic to suggest-or if it is, so be
it-that so egregious a defect entitles us to view other parts of
the document with some caution. Nor should we overlook the
discomforting fact that it was just two hundred years ago, a blink
in historical time, that history's greatest assembly of democrats
and constitutionalists boasted many slaveholders among its most
able and prominent members."l This should remind us that we
are not so far removed from a world-view we can now scarcely
imagine sharing, and that our own descendants may look back
upon us as equally benighted. History is largely the narrative of
the struggle for freedom and decency, and state constitutions
are the best weapons, sword and shield, of the oppressed and the
potentially oppressed, but only if they are activated.
5.
The Federal Constitution, at least as respects individual liberties, is a blueprint of the superstructure, so to speak, an outline
of minimum safety specifications for the ship of state. The states,
in fashioning their own vessels, must conform to these general
guidelines, but they are at liberty to add their own details. They
may not reduce or eliminate federal protections, but they may
supplement them, and indeed they are encouraged to do so.14
How important is this? We might recall that H.M.S. Titanic, largest and greatest ship produced to its own time by a nation rich in
seafaring tradition and expertise, conformed to current safety requirements. She foundered nevertheless as a result of a combination of defects in safety design and reckless navigation. She
would surely not have gone to the bottom if she had had easily
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, ci. 3.
13. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4 (providing an exhaustive history of the long
dominance of pro-slavery sentiment among much of the country's political leadership).
14. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)
(holding that states are free to read their own constitutions more liberally than the
Federal Constitution); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that states possess the sovereign right to adopt more expansive individual liberties);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that states
are not precluded from applying higher standards); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728
(1975) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that states are free to strike a balance between
individual rights and police powers within constitutional limits).
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constructed continuous bulkheads below decks, and even without those bulkheads there would have been little or no loss of
life if she had had more lifeboats. It really was as simple as
that. 15

The Titanic, for all the ignominy that has since attached to
her, was overall a good ship, built to and even beyond the accepted state of the art of naval architecture. Her owners, of
course, were free to build her better, but they were not required
to do so, and the additional expense-though it appears trivial
in retrospect-persuaded them against more bulkhead steel and
lifeboat wood. 16
So too with our constitutional scheme. The analogy is imperfect, as all analogies are, but the Federal Constitution's incorporation of slavery may be compared to the Titanic's fatal
bulkheads, just as its lack of precision on the respective roles of
state and federal governments and in the definition of crucial
phrases, such as due process, is comparable to the shortage of
lifeboats. The republic very nearly foundered on the slavery
question; she survived only because enough states that had eliminated slavery held her together at enormous cost.
6.
Let us modify the metaphor a little. Suppose the United
States Constitution contained a clause requiring that all citizens
be provided with safe housing. Further suppose that the United
States Supreme Court had held that this meant, at least, that
public accommodations must have fire escapes, and that this applies to states. Nothing in that, of course, prevents a state from
enacting, or construing, a state constitution to require more.
Florida, for example, may find certain construction practices
necessary or desirable because of the likelihood of hurricanes,
and California because of earthquakes, and Oklahoma because
of tornadoes, and Alaska because of cold and snow. What is
"safe" in one state may not be so in another.
But no geographic or climatic extremes or divergences are
necessary. An inland state of moderate climate, for example,
may decide that it wants a more universally rewarding quality of
life, and therefore require that housing have more fire escapes
15. See MICHAEL DAVIE, TITANIC: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF A LEGEND 16-22 (1987);
GEOFFREY MARCUS, THE MAIDEN VOYAGE 30 (1969).

16. MARcus, supra note 15, at 30.
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than federally-mandated, as well as smoke detectors and sprinkler systems-neither of which incidentally was available or even
envisioned when the state or Federal Constitution was adopted,
but is surely within the concept of safety. It is enough if the state
wants it that way; it need not be even manifestly necessary.
No one would deny the power of states to adopt these measures. Only the desirability and practicality are debatable. We
may reflect that a police state, against which constitutional liberties are the ultimate safety measures, is a far more ominous and
pervasive threat than hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, or
cold.
7.
The Federal Constitution would have been a sounder structure if slavery had been eliminated, and perhaps even if it had
been universally protected. The Dred Scott case, which as much
as any single factor precipitated the civil war, may thereby have
been avoided.1 7 But that was not feasible. The Constitution, like
the Bill of Rights, was a compromise, as are all democratic documents-and as every generalization, such as due process, must
be. 8 The founders knew this, of course, and it was central to
their genius that they left the filling-in of details largely to two
institutions: the judiciary and the states.1 9
But while the drafters of constitutions must be great compromisers, the judges who construe constitutions generally must not
be. Marshall's great phrase in M'Culloch v. Maryland2 ° that it is "a
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See also FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 4, at 365414.
18. See Learned Hand, Morals in Public Life, in THE SPinRT OF LIBERTY, 245, 251-52
(Irving Dillard ed., 3rd ed. 1963):
We believe, and I think properly, that when the men who met in 1787 to make
a Constitution made the best political document ever made, they did it very
largely because they were great compromisers. Do not forget that. They did
put in the Bill of Rights afterwards; but the thing that made it stick was that
they were great compromisers as to the immediate issues which were before
them.
Id.
19. The great decisions of the Marshall Court, see supra notes 3 & 7, together with
such other landmarks as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), established
the power ofjudicial review of legislation, state and federal, which we sometimes forget
was not at all explicit in the Constitution itself, and upon which the founders were by
no means of one mind. See 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 3, 1-156.
20. 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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constitution we are expounding"2 1 (and the emphasis falls naturally and usually on that word), can also be read: It is a constitution we are expounding. The tasks of writing and interpreting
constitutions are quite different things, not least because drafters must build in flexibility to accommodate unseen future
events, while courts interpreting those provisions must apply the
generalities to actual and quite specific events as they arise and
come before them.
The federal judiciary's task is to decide the scope of minimal
protections of national application; federal courts may say what
quality of steel should form the bulkheads and what wood the
boats. They may not extend the bulkheads beyond the constitution's blueprint, or multiply the lifeboats. But the people mayby amending the Federal Constitution or through the design of
their individual state constitutions as their chosen judges may
construe them. And so they have, though for a long while they
largely abdicated this crucial function. This is the process only
recently getting underway and with which we are here
concerned.
8.
Just about a decade ago, another lawyer and I undertook to
examine what we took to be the relative neglect of the Minnesota Constitution and found that in no instance in recent memory had the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the state
constitution as more protective of individual rights than the federal counterpart 22-a conclusion which, I am happy to report,
has been rendered a historical curiosity by a line of decisions in
which our court has placed Minnesota among those giving vigorous new life to their moribund constitutions. 23 It is in fact a remarkable development in so short a period of time, a record of
which the judges and lawyers who were involved may justifiably
be proud, and which should be an incentive to continuing
development.
21. Id. at 407. See alsoJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) ("It is, after all, a
National Constitution we are expounding.").
22. Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the
Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMLINE L. REV.51 (1984). The slightly censorious sub-title would
no longer apply, and it is pleasing to be able to acknowledge its obsoleteness.
23. See infra notes accompanying part 18.
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9.
The Minnesota Supreme Court had long recognized, but declined to exercise, its power to expand upon federal constitutional protections. When invited to do so, it routinely found the
federal doctrine congenial, or at least acceptable, though some
interesting dicta and dissents foreshadowed a. more individualistic future.2 4
10.
Each state's constitution, like its history, its geography, and its
people, is unique. Some state constitutions predate the United
States Constitution, of course, and these should not be overlooked as a source of light in both state and federal constitutional litigation,25 just as some guidance may be found in
documents as remote as Magna Carta and other English sources.
More immediate history, however, is of greater relevance to
construing the constitution that emerged from it. In Minnesota's case, the antecedents are in the Northwest Ordinance of
1787,26 an instructive document too seldom examined these days,
and in the extraordinary conditions that unfolded in the years
24. See, e.g., AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 and 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 580
(Minn. 1983) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (equal protection); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180,
183 n.l (Minn. 1983) (self-incrimination); State v. Kraft, 326 N.W.2d 840, 841-42 (Minn.
1982) (cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Willis, 320 N.W.2d 726, 727 (Minn.
1982) (standing); State ex rel. Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738
n.6 (Minn. 1981) (free speech co-extensive); Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d
273, 281 n.14 (Minn. 1981) (equal protection); State v. Goar, 295 N.W.2d 633, 634 n.l
(Minn. 1980) (impeachment through the use of pre-arrest silence); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (unreasonable searches and seizures); Kelsey v. State,
283 N.W.2d 892, 896 n.l (Minn. 1979) (Scott, J., concurring) (due process); Shreve v.
Department of Economic Sec., 283 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Minn. 1979) (due process); State
v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.14 (Minn. 1977) (right to counsel); Americans United
Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622, 288 Minn. 196, 213, 179 N.W.2d 146, 155 (1970)
(holding the Minnesota Constitution is more restrictive than the establishment of religion clause of the Federal First Amendment); State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 21, 110
N.W.2d 514, 522-23 (1961) (quoting State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221
Minn. 246, 265, 21 N.W.2d 792, 800 (1946)) (holding Minnesota Supreme Court not
bound to follow "interpretive relaxation [s] of the inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment made by the Supreme Court of the United States" when applying state due process clause); Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)
(due process coextensive); Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 269-70, 253 N.W. 102, 109
(1934) (equal protection coextensive).
25. See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980).
26. Act ofJuly 13, 1787, 1878 U.S. REv. STAT., 2D ED. 13, reprinted in 1 MINN. STAT.
ANN. 39 (West 1992).
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before our statehood in 1857.27 In those days, an obscure slave
named Dred Scott resided for a time at Fort Snelling, and an
obscure lawyer-politician named Lincoln studied the state of the
union with alarm in Springfield, Illinois. Race, slavery and
state's rights dominated political intercourse. The Missouri
Compromise, the Wilmot Proviso, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act
were hopeful, yet cynical, efforts to accommodate irreconcilable
differences and to avert inevitable confrontation between states.
For her part, Minnesota, then a territory, never embraced slavery,
and her statehood was virulently opposed for this reason. She
came into the Union, paired with Kansas, in 1858.28
It was not a gentle birth. Republicans and Democrats were so
hostilely divided at the constitutional convention in 1857 that
they refused to meet together. 9 Delegates fought physically as
well as verbally. Despite all this, a conference committee eventually drafted a constitution acceptable to both parties."0
Or, more accurately, two constitutions were drafted.3 1
Although reason had prevailed far enough to bring the parties
together philosophically, charity and forgiveness remained in
too short supply to bring them together physically. Republicans
and Democrats signed separate constitutions. 32 Not least remarkable among the peculiarities of Minnesota's constitution
therefore, is that there are two of them-or were, until they were
consolidated in the restructuring of 1974."
The two constitutions were virtually identical, but the duality
itself is richly symbolic. At its worst, the duality reflects the ugliness of closed-minded partisanship, an almost childish spitefulness more suitable to the playground than to parliamentary
chambers. At its best, however, it represents an ability to compromise on substance while retaining the sense and trappings of
individuality.
27. See generally JULIus E. HAYcLRAFT, TERRITORIAL EXISTENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
STATEHOOD OF MINNESOTA (1946), reprinted in I MINN. STAT. ANN. 145 (West 1992); WLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA (1921).
28.

HAYCRAFT, supra note 27, at 153.

29. Id. at 151-52.
30. Id.
31.

Id. at 152.

32. TERRITORIAL EXISTENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATEHOOD, reprinted in
STAT. ANN. 151 (West 1992) [hereinafter STATEHOOD].

I

MINN.

33. Id. at 297.
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11.
It is largely symbolic, but a symbol not to be scorned, that the
bill of rights is the very first article of the Minnesota Constitution, 34 whereas the Federal Bill of Rights was not even part of the
original Constitution, but was added as a group of amendments
in 1791. 35
12.
Not long after adoption, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret the constitution independently of, and, to
a degree, antagonistically to federal law, in Davis v. Pierse.36 Dr.
F.A.W. Davis had been involved in a number of complex real
37
estate transactions in St. Paul, before he moved to Mississippi.
He began an action in Ramsey County, 8 but the legislature, in
1862, had adopted a statute "suspending the privilege of all persons aiding the rebellion against the United States, of prosecuting and defending actions and judicial proceedings in this
state."39 The defendants claimed that Davis, as a resident of Mississippi, was aiding the rebellion and could not proceed against
them in a Minnesota court.4 ° This, of course, was about the time
Lincoln-in the least palatable of all his actions-suspended the
writ of habeas corpus, in response to a national temperament
that condoned and even demanded the suspension of liberty as
41
a means for vindicating it.
34. MINN. CONsr. art. I.
35.

KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 2, at 174-77.

36. 7 Minn. 13, 7 Gil. 1 (1862).
37. Davis v. Pierse contains few facts on the underlying case, and discusses only the
constitutional issues. Id. at 13, 7 Gil. 1. The documents in the remaining file, curiously
enough, discuss the real estate transactions at length, but have almost nothing to say of
the constitutional question. Therefore, unless documents have been lost, or filed elsewhere, it appears the question was raised and argued orally, not having been joined in
pleadings or briefs.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 15, 7 Gil. at 3 (referencing 1862 MINN. LAWS 61).
40. Id.
41. James Russell Lowell wrote:
Hain't we saved Habus Coppers,
improved it in fact,
By suspendin' the Unionists
"stid of" the Act?
James Russell Lowell, Bigelow Papers, Ser. 2, no. 4.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court heard arguments three times,
"each time by different and learned counsel,"4 2 who offered
"three distinct and elaborate discussions of this question,"4 3
before the court held the statute unconstitutional." The court
acknowledged that it was natural during such a war for any patriotic citizen to believe that anyone engaged in "this traitorous attempt to dismember the republic" should not enjoy the
privileges "secured to him only by that government which he has
renounced and is striving to subvert."4 5
Davis lays an apt foundation for all later constitutional adjudication. Because it was a decision forged by the most threatening
circumstances imaginable to the advocate of state constitutional
independence, and because in the everyday practice of law-to
our loss-we rarely delve so far back into our fertile history, it is
instructive to look closely at the court's reasoning. Such scrutiny
is productive because we are largely unaccustomed to working
with the state constitution at all or to giving it the respect it
deserves.
The language of the Davis opinion, in the context not only of
its times but of our times, is an appropriate inspiration to the
enthusiasm of any lawyer who undertakes to apply this body of
law. It is, after all, an instance of the state constitution being
used as a repository of individual rights against the legislature,
against the federal government, against overwhelming public
sentiment, and in favor of the least favored of citizens in a time
of most acute crisis.
Chief Justice Emmett, writing for the Davis majority, noted:
[T]he very fact that the act was passed under such a state of
excitement admonishes us of the necessity of carefully examining its several provisions, lest in our anxiety to punish the
guilty authors and abettors of our national troubles, we do far
greater injury to ourselves, by forgetting justice and disregarding the wholesome restraints of our fundamental law.
If the state of governmental affairs were always peaceful
and quiet, and legislation never attended with undue excitement, many of the restrictions imposed by constitutional governments upon legislative power might be dispensed with as
unnecessary; but it is precisely because emergencies will arise,
42.
43.
44.
45.

Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 15, 7 Gil. 1, 3 (1862).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15, 7 Gil. at 3.
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which, for the time, seem to demand orjustify a resort to radical and extreme measures, that these various inhibitions are
declared in the fundamental law; and, as extraordinary acts of
legislation are seldom resorted to, except when the public exigencies seem to demand them, it may truly be said that these
provisions are inserted in constitutionsfor the very purpose of meeting
this plea of necessity. Hence the greaterthe seeming necessity, or popular demand for such legislation, the greater the danger to be apprehended from yielding to it, and the more imperative the obligation on
the part of the courts to square it rigorously by the constitution;as no

act in conflict with that instrument can ever become a law,
however just, abstractly considered, its provisions may be; or
however great 46
and immediate the apparent necessity for such
an enactment.
Thus, the first great principle may be stated as follows: No law in
conflict with the constitution is valid, no matter how "abstractly"
just or how apparently necessary. Chief Justice Emmett noted
that the State Bill of Rights affords "every person [a] certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in
his person, property or character," without exception.4 7 This
broadest of guarantees is not found in the Federal Constitution.
The Chief Justice continued:
And why, it may well be asked, should there be an exception?
Why should simple justice, as against another, be denied to
any citizen, however fallen, degraded or guilty, he may be?
The chief end of government is the protection of the rights of
all-the bad no less than the good-and, even without a constitutional provision, every member of society may rightfully
claim protection of his person and property. To deny it to any
one member of society is an injury to the community at large, and
none the less so though the sufferer may have committed crimes worthy
of imprisonment or death. We would never for one moment sup-

pose that the legislature has the power, under the constitution, to deprive a person, or class of persons, of the right of
trial by jury, or to subject them to imprisonment for debt, or
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, to unreasonable
searches; or their property to be taken for public use without
just compensation; and yet neither of these is more sacred to
the citizen, or more carefully guarded by the constitution,
than the right to have a certain and prompt remedy in the

46. Id. at 16, 7 Gil. at 4 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 17, 7 Gil. at 5; MINN. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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laws for all injuries or wrongs to person, property, or
character.
We think that the framers of the constitution intended that
there should be no exception to the rule declared in the 8th
section of the Bill of Rights, and are of opinion that to admit
of one would not only be violative of every principle ofjustice,
but wholly beneath the dignity of a free government. This is a
mere question of legislative power under the constitution, and if we
once admit that even the rebel or traitor can, in the face of
the constitutional provision so often referred to, be deprived
of the privilege of suing and defending in our courts, the
same consequences may, in the discretion of the legislature,
be visited upon criminals of every grade; for there is no line at
which the law-making power can be stopped, if once permitted to pass that prescribed by the fundamental law.4 8
The phrase a "mere question of legislative power" has a nice ironic
touch to it, putting the legislature into its proper place in the
constitutional scheme of things. This proposition is even more
worthy of attention today given the pervasive effect that legislation and regulation have on our lives.
13.
Our constitution also places significant emphasis on the inviolable rights of even the worst person. Our "democratic" belief in
"majority rule" often conflicts with the purpose of our constitution. In the end, it is the role of the constitution, and particularly the bill of rights, to protect the rights of the minority, even
a minority of one, from the tyranny of the majority. ChiefJustice
Emmett reflected that "in the end, all must regard as a matter of
pride and gratulation, that in this state, no one, not even the
worst of felons, can be denied the right to simple justice."4 9
The passage of time has done nothing to dilute this language
which leaves little doubt about the potency of the state constitution. We should remember that even in peacetime, it is generally only questions of great public importance that lead to
disputes which must be resolved under a constitution.

48. Id. at 18-19, 7 Gil. 1, 6-7 (emphasis added).
49. Id. 23, 7 Gil. at 11.
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14.
In some cases the federal and state constitutions are, in fact,
coextensive. In these instances, it is entirely proper for the court
to follow federal law. It is notable, however, that decisions that
do so have often inspired thoughtful and spirited dissents or
concurrences.
For example, in State v. Fuller," the court declined to decide
whether the state prohibition on double jeopardy is broader
than the federal counterpart.5 ' In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Wahl noted, "[t]hat state constitutional guarantees were 'meant
to be and remain genuine guarantees against misuses of the
state's governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and
falling tides of federal case law.' -52
In State v. Murphy,5 3 the court held that a confession to a probation officer violated the Federal Constitution.5 4 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in Minnesota v. Murphy.5 5 On remand, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the confession violated the Minnesota Constitution.5 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court deferred to the United States
Supreme Court's ruling and affirmed a murder conviction resulting from the confession.5
In State v. Lanam,5 8 the court held that use of a child witness's
statement did not violate the right to confrontation, relying principally on United States Supreme Court cases.5 9 Justice Kelley
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Popovich and Justice Yetka.
His opinion provides a good example of the type of analysis
designed to demonstrate that, even though the federal and state
constitutional clauses are facially the same, the right "under the
50. 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985).
51. Id. at 727.
52. Id.
53. 24 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. 1982), rev'd sub nom Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984).
54. 324 N.W.2d at 344-45.
55. 465 U.S. at 420.
56. State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986).
57. Id. Justice Wahl dissented, however, stating that prior state case law failed to
support the holding rendered by the Supreme Court. Id. at 773. Note that if the state
supreme court's previous ruling had been exclusively under the state and not the Federal Constitution, it would not have been reviewable. Thus, the choice of constitutions
had practical consequences for Mr. Murphy who received a life sentence.
58. 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990) (Kelley, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 659.
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Minnesota Constitution does have a history independent of the
[Federal] Sixth Amendment in cases purporting to construe it."'
Justice Wahl's dissent in State v. Murphy, performed a similar explication of self-incrimination law.6"
In State v. Sorenson,6 2 a search and seizure case, the court declined to consider the state constitution on an independent basis
because the issue had not been raised in the trial court and was
"neither adequately briefed nor litigated."" Justice Kelley concurred, adding that he would have reached the same decision
under the state constitutional provision, which is "virtually identical" to the Federal Fourth Amendment.6 4 This is notable because, in earlier years, the question of a different state result
would not have been likely to arise. Now the court is properly
conscious of the need for, or at least the desirability of, explaining why the state document does not depart from the federal.
In State ex rel. Humphrey v. Casino Marketing Group, Inc.,6 5 the
court held that restrictions on direct-dial marketing did not violate the state or federal rights to free speech, reaffirming that
the state clause provides no greater protection of commercial
speech than does its federal counterpart.6 6 The decision can be
viewed as a commentary on the right to privacy, which was in
effect vindicated in its collision with free speech.

60. Id. at 663.
61. State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 773-77 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., dissenting).
62. 441 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. 1989).
63. Id. at 457. The court recognized, however, that it had the discretion to decide
such issues. Id.
64. In relevant part, Justice Kelley stated that:
In such case, this court will not lightly reject a Supreme Court interpretation
of identical, or substantially similar language, nor "cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has considered the [Flederal [C]onstitution." The court historically has not, nor should
it, absent unique or distinctive Minnesota conditions, depart from the general
principle favoring unanimity merely because of its philosophical rejection of a
particular constitutional interpretation emanating from the [F]ederal
Supreme Court.
Id. at 460 (KelleyJ., concurring specially) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Gray, 413
N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987)).
65. 491 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1992).
66. Id. at 885 n.2; see also State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6
(Minn. 1981) (stating that protection of commercial speech is no more extensive under
state constitution than under Federal First Amendment).
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The right to privacy is poised for growth under the Minnesota
Constitution.6 7 The court has described it as an "emerging" doctrine.6 8 A general right to privacy has been recognized,6 9 but its
contours remain to be delineated for both civil and criminal purposes and this may affect such diverse concerns as tort law, 70 admissibility of evidence in criminal cases, 71 abortion and other
health-related procedures, 72 and public access to data held in
government files and computers.73
In State v. Gray,7 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
district court to hold that the state sodomy law did not violate
the right to privacy under the Minnesota Constitution, 75 following a then recent United States Supreme Court decision under
federal law. 76 The state supreme court held for the first time
that a right of privacy is embodied in the state constitution,7 7 but
declined to find that "the right of consenting adults to engage in
private sexual conduct within the privacy of the home [is a] fundamental right."78 Noting that the contact leading to the acts in
question began in public and that it was a case of "sex for compensation," the court expressed its fear that to affirm could lead
to invalidating laws against prostitution.7 9
67. See Michael K. Steenson, FundamentalRights in the "Gray" Area: The Right to Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 383 (1994).
68. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 256-57, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (1976) (stating
that more than just a bare conclusion concerning the presence or absence of the right
to privacy is required due to its importance).
69. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
70. Minnesota has not yet recognized invasion of privacy as a tort. See, e.g., Markgrafv. Douglas Corp., 468 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Hendry v. Conner, 303
Minn. 317, 319, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975).
71. State v. Bates, 507 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence of
sexual preference is admissible only when it is relevant to the charged crime).
72. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (holding
that Minnesota's wrongful death statute does not violate the constitution with regard to
the right of abortion).
73. Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. CL App. 1994) (holding that public school
teachers do not have a right to privacy in their personnel records).
74. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
75. Id.
76. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77. Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111.
78. Id. at 113.
79. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1987). The court elaborated by stating that:
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Since we hardly suspect the court of homophobia, and its emphasis here is emphatically on commercialsex, its expressed reluctance to the phrase "debase both the Constitution and the
concept of fundamental rights"8" must be supposed to mean simply that sex-for-hire is not a fundamental right in Minnesota, not
necessarily that other private conduct, sexual or otherwise, may
not be. Indeed, in an unusual coda the court seemed to recognize that further assertions of the right to privacy are to be expected, even encouraged."'
16.
The right to privacy is also a vivid example of an area where
constitutional law-as well as statutory and common law-must
adapt to rapid technological development. Justice Jackson
wrote: "The greatest expounders of the Constitution, from John
Marshall to Oliver Wendell Holmes, have always insisted that the
strength and vitality of the Constitution stem from the fact that
its principles are adaptable to changing events."8" Indeed, in
what appears only superficially to be a paradox, Marshall captured what might be called the indispensable lasting-changing
[T] o say that there exists a fundamental right under our constitution to engage
in sodomous acts within a sex for compensation relationship and therefore
afford this activity constitutional protection under the right of privacy, is not
only to extend that privacy right far beyond constitutional cases, but it is to
debase both the Constitution and the concept of fundamental rights.
Therefore, we decline the invitation to expand our state constitutional protection by way of creating a fundamental right of privacy which protects those
who engage in commercial sex ....
Id.
80. Id.
81. The court intimated that the right to privacy may expand in the future when it
stated that:
We emphasize that nothing in the court's opinion, either expressly or impliedly, expands the individual's right of privacy under the Minnesota Constitution beyond the parameters established for that right by the United States
Supreme Court under our Federal Constitution. Today's decision is limited to
a holding that any asserted Minnesota constitutional privacy right does not
encompass the protection of those who traffic in commercial sexual conduct.
Whether the scope of any privacy right asserted under the Minnesota Constitution should be expanded beyond federal holdings remains to be resolved in future cases
wherein the issue is properly raised.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare the approach of Gray with Minnesota League of Credit
Unions v. Minnesota Dep't of Commerce, 486 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1992), where the
court found no reason on the facts to go beyond federal law, but said in important and
suggestive dictum: "Our examination of [a]rticle I, § 3 of the Minnesota Constitution
leads us to believe that it may provide greater protection for freedom of speech than
the United States Constitution." Id. at 404.
82. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, 174 (1941).
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nature of constitutional material when he wrote: "This provision
is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. '8 3 The Federal Constitution is an organicsuperstructure
whose boundaries are molded by the United States Supreme
Court within these broad and rather glacially changing limits;
the state organism grows according to the wisdom of state
judges.
17.
This is not to say, of course, that a state constitution is infinitely malleable. It is, after all, a constitution, written to endure
by reasonable adaptability to changing conditions. It can be
facially altered only by amendment, a cumbersome and uncertain process not to be over-encouraged. The pressure for
change, which ultimately leads to widespread sentiment for
amendment, can only be deflated by judicial construction of existing provisions. To an extent, then, appellate judges should
see the constitution as a prospective device, anticipatory of and
adaptable to future developments. Judges should ask not only
what the drafters intended by a particular word or phrase, but
also what would they, or like minded persons, intend-what language would they use-faced with today's conditions?
18.
Some cases, of course, involve construction of the state constitution without reference to its federal counterpart, especially
where there is no identical or comparable provision in the
United States Constitution. The cases that follow illustrate how
Minnesota state courts have construed the state constitution
without the help, or hindrance, of federal constitutional
guidance.
State v. Krjci,8 4 for example, involved construction of the Minnesota Constitution's criminal trial venue clause, which requires
a jury trial in the district where the crime occurred. 8' The majority found no violation of the clause in a statute allowing a
child abuse trial in the county where the child is found.8 6 Justice
83.
84.
85.
86.

M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
458 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1990).
MINN. CONST., art. I, § 6.
Krejci, 458 N.W.2d at 412.
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Kelley dissented, stating that the constitutional language required a contrary result "[a]bout as clearly as it could be
stated." 7 The majority's holding apparently did not result from
deference to a federal provision or construction.
In Rice v. Connolly,"s the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to construe a 1982 amendment to the Minnesota Constitution which authorized pari-mutuel wagering. s9 The Rice court
held that the amendment did not allow "off track" forms of betting and thus the legislation doing so was invalid.9 0
In Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,9 ' reversing the
court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court construed article I, section 13 of the state constitution to allow compensation
to a homeowner whose property was damaged by police intru92
sion while attempting to apprehend an armed suspect.
In Castorv. City of Minneapolis,9 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court
also construed the property-taking doctrine under article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution.9 4 The court held that, in
certain circumstances, the building of a skyway is a compensable
taking by the city,9 5 relying exclusively on Minnesota case law
construing the Minnesota Constitution.9 6
87. Id. at 414 (Kelley, J.,dissenting); see also State v. Hanson, 285 N.W.2d 483, 48586 (Minn. 1979) (finding venue under federal and state constitutions proper in any
county where any element of the crime was committed).
88. 488 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1992).
89. Id. at 242.
90. Id. at 247-48. The court restated these basic principles of constitutional
construction:
The rules governing the courts in construing articles of the State Constitution
are well settled. The primary purpose of the courts is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature and people in adopting the article in
question. If the language used is unambiguous, it must be taken as it reads,
and in that case there is no room for construction. The entire article is to be
construed as a whole, and receive a practical, common sense construction. It
should be construed in the light of the social, economic, and political situation of the people at the time of its adoption, as well as subsequent changes in
such conditions.
Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
91. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991); see also Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatoiy
Takings, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 433 (1994).
92. Id. at 39. The police fired at least 25 rounds of tear gas into the defendant's
house during the confrontation. Id. In addition, the police cast three concussion or
"flash-bang" grenades into the house to confuse the suspect. Id. Appellant estimated
damages of $71,000 to her home as a result of the police department's activities. Id.
93. 429 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1988).
94. Id. at 245-46.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id. at 245-46.
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19.
Of greater interest and perhaps more gratifying are the cases
where courts have recognized protections in the Minnesota Constitution which are greater than those found in the Federal Constitution. Jarvis v. Levine97 addressed a significant state issue
involving a Minnesota resident committed to an institution pursuant to state law,9 and held that compelled administration of
drugs without prior judicial approval violates the right to privacy
under the Minnesota Constitution.9 9 The court held that it was
not bound by a United States Supreme Court case concerning
patients' rights,'0 0 and decided the case exclusively under the
state constitution. 10°
In re Schmidt,"0 2 also involved the subject of involuntary administration of drugs to the mentally ill,103 and held that a statutory
amendment satisfied the due process and privacy criteria of
Jarvis under the state constitution.0 4 The court also stated that
an equal protection argument 0 5had not been raised at trial and,
therefore, was not reviewable.1
In State v. Hamm,'0 6 the court held a statute allowing six-memberjuries in non-felony cases to be a violation of article I, section
6 of the Minnesota Constitution. 7 This was required by a previous case where the court construed the phrase "impartial jury"
97. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
98. Id. at 140-50.
99. Id. at 150. This advancement starkly contrasts with the court's holding in Price
v. Sheppard in which only the Federal Constitution was considered. See Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976) (holding involuntary drug treatment not
intrusive per se and thus, not requiring premedication judicial review). In Price, no
indication was given as to why the case was decided solely under the Federal Constitution. One may surmise, however, that the parties failed to raise the state constitutional
issues.
100. SeeYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that professional judgments are entitled to a presumption of validity).
101. 418 N.W.2d at 147.
102. 443 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 830. The court's review of MINN. STAT. § 253B.03(6) (a), entitled "Administration of neuroleptic medication," resulted in a finding that Mr. Schmidt's right of
privacy was not violated. Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d at 830.
105. Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d at 828 n.7.
106. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988).
107. Id. at 386. The court struck down MINN. STAT. § 593.01 (1) as unconstitutional.
The statute read as follows:
Notwithstanding any law or rule of court to the contrary, a petit jury is a
body of six men or women, or both, impaneled and sworn in any court to try
and determine, by a true and unanimous verdict, any question or issue of fact
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to mean ajury of twelve. 108 The change was short-lived, however,
because article I, sections 4 and 6 were amended later that same
year, 10 9 authorizing juries of less than twelve, but not less than
six, in civil and non-felony cases.1 10
1 11 on remand from the United States
In State v. Hershberger,
Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court held a statute requiring display of a slow-moving vehicle emblem violated Amish
persons' freedom of conscience rights under article I, section 16
of the Minnesota Constitution. 1 2 The court explicitly and commendably chose this course rather than to apply a United States
13
Supreme Court decision of uncertain meaning.
Another case of unusual interest in several respects is State v.
French." 4 The central holding is relatively narrow: the Minnesota Human Rights Act 5 does not forbid a private person, on
religious principles, from refusing to rent to an unmarried, cohabiting couple.1 16 Justice Yetka for the majority, however, undertook to explicate the Minnesota Constitution's religious liberty clause, article I, section 16, and the preamble, even though
the appellant had relied principally on the Federal Constitution."' Citing historical as well as textual reasons for finding
this clause of special importance in the state, as compared with
the Federal First Amendment, the majority detected a "more
stringent burden on the state" and "more protection of religious
18
freedom."
in a civil or criminal action or proceeding, according to the law and the evidence as given them in court.
Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 386.
108. State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 439, 440, 14 Gil. 330, 331 (1869).
109. MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6 (amended 1988).
110. Id.
111. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
112. Id. at 397.
113. Id. at 396. Notably, this approach stands in contrast to that of State v. Sports
and Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), which relied on both the state and
federal constitutions.
114. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
115. MINN. STAT. § 363.01-.15 (1992).
116. French, 460 N.W.2d at 4.
117. Id. at 8 (stating that Minnesota Constitution grants greater protection of religious freedom than does the Federal Constitution).
118. Id. at 10. In impassioned language, Justice Yetka wrote:
It appears that we have now reached the stage in Minnesota constitutional law
where the religious views of a probable majority of the Minnesota citizens are
being alleged by a state agency to violate state law. Today we have a department of state government proposing that, while French has sincere religious
beliefs and those beliefs are being infringed upon by the Human Rights Act,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994

21

William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 20,LAW
Iss. 2REVIEW
[1994], Art. 2
WILLIAM
MITCHELL

[Vol. 20

The court found insufficient "compelling" interests to justify
the state's intrusion upon the landlord's religious liberty, bolstering this argument by an animated defense of the institution
of marriage. 1 9 Interestingly, the privacy interest of the renters
and the doctrine of equal protection were not discussed, apparently not having been urged by counsel, or perhaps not urged
with sufficient persuasion.
Justice Simonett concurred in the result but did not believe
the constitutional question need be raised since construction of
the statute disposed of the case.' 2 ' Chief Justice Popovich,
joined by Justices Wahl and Keith, dissented and would have
12
found the landlord in violation of the statute. '
In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 1 22 the court held
that a motorist has a limited right under the Minnesota Constitu12 3
tion to consult counsel before being subjected to a blood test.
The opinion traces the history of the right to counsel in Minnesota, vis d vis federal law that the court had earlier applied to
24
reach a contrary result in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety.'
The court overruled Nyflot, stating that what had changed since
then was not the membership of the court, but rather, "the development of state constitutionallaw."125 The court further stated that
state courts are returning to the practice of protecting individual
liberties, as intended by the colonists before the United States
the state, nevertheless, has an interest in promoting access to housing for cohabiting couples which overrides French's right to exercise his religion.
Respondent characterizes the state's interest as "eliminating pernicious discrimination, including marital status discrimination." We are not told what is
so pernicious about refusing to treat unmarried, cohabiting couples as if they
were legally married. The state does not even attempt to reconcile this notion
with this court's express recognition of the "preferred status" of the institution
of marriage ....
Id.
119. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10-11 (Minn. 1990).
120. Id. at 11 (Simonett,J., concurring).
121. Id. at 11-21 (Popovich, C.J., Wahl & Keith,JJ., dissenting) (arguing that federal
and state protection for religious freedom are overridden by state's interest in preventing marital discrimination that is prima facie violation of the Minnesota Human Rights
Act). The French decision demonstrates the need for vigorous advocacy of state constitutional issues, in a context where two or more provisions appear to collide. We may
wonder, had equal protection and privacy been strongly asserted, would the result of
this very close decision have changed?
122. 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
123. Id. at 837.
124. 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985).
125. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835-36 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court existed. 1 26 The court articulated its rationale by
noting that "[i]n recent years, as the United States Supreme
Court has retrenched on Bill of Rights issues, state courts have
begun to interpret expansively the rights guaranteed under their
own state constitutions. "1127
Equal protection, which is not explicit in the state constitution, unlike the federal counterpart, was construed independently in State v. Russell,12 8 to strike down a statute punishing
crack cocaine offenses more severely than ordinary cocaine
crimes because of its disproportionate enforcement against
black defendants. 1 29 The decision 30 and dissent 131 also refer to
a question of substantive due process. The decision in State v.
Russell resulted in
an amendment to Minnesota's controlled sub13 2
stance statute.
In re E.D.J. represents the extremely interesting phenomenon
of a state court departing from a federal constitutional position
by construing an identical provision in reliance on its own precedents. 33 In E.D.J., reversing the court of appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court explicitly declined to follow the United States
Supreme Court's restrictive holding in California v. Hodari3 4 regarding when a seizure occurs.13 5 Instead, the court adhered to
its earlier cases construing the identical language of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. 136 The court reiterated
its concise description of the principles governing state departures from federal law.
20.
The various rationales for state constitutional decisions are
sometimes denominated as: (a) the "primacy" or "self-reliant"
126. Id.
127. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 1991);
see also McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991) (applying Friedman to implied consent advisories).
128. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
129. Id. at 889; see generally Ann L. lijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulas" or "New Articulations," 20 Wm.MITCHELL L. REV. 337 (1994).
130. 477 N.W.2d at 893 (Simonett, J.,concurring specially).
131. Id. at 897 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
132. 1992 MINN. LAws ch. 359, §§ 1-10.
133. 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993).
134. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
135. 502 N.W.2d at 780.
136. Id. at 781.
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approach, in which priority is given to the state constitution regardless of language in or construction of the federal; 137 (b) the
"interstitial" or "reactive" approach, which looks first to federal
law as a "settled floor of rights" and then asks "whether and how
to criticize, amplify, or supplement" it for state purposes;1 38 or
(c) the "lock-step" approach, which essentially adopts a settled
federal position with little or no debate or elaboration."3 9 We
might call this last the "grudging" position, found usually in dissents or concurrences in which ajudge marshals all available arguments against expanding a federal right, while ostensibly
recognizing the state's power to do so.140
21.
The primacy model is the most appealing to the devotee of
the state constitution, but it is surely unwise to be willfully blind
to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, particularly where the language under consideration is the same. At the
very least, that Court provides an instructive starting point. Having done that, the question becomes: What considerations will
encourage or support a departure? The test need not, and
should not, be a stringent one, but unless we have only contempt
137. See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1342, 1357-58 (1982) [hereinafter Developments]; see generally Linde,
supra note 24.
138. See Developments, supra note 134, at 1362.
139. See Rita Coyle DeMeules, Minnesota's Variable Approach to State Constitutional
Claims, 17 Wm. MITCHELL L. Rv. 163, 179 (1991). With disapproval, the author suggests
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to many constitutional issues is lock-step
and that the court undervalues the cases in which it has demonstrated independence.
Id. California, a state that has frequently amended its constitution by the proposition
method, lock-stepped itself to federal law on the exclusionary rule by this route in 1972,
via Proposition 18. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
140. For vivid examples, see Justice Coyne's dissents in State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d
886, 895 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judicial branch has no
inherent authority to set the terms or conditions of punishment for a criminal act) and
Friedman v. Commissioner, 473 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J.,dissenting)
(arguing that the court's role is to determine whether a statute has met minimum constitutional requirements, not to question the wisdom of the statute itself). Compare
these cases with her majority opinion in State ex rel. Humphrey v. Casino Mktg. Group,
Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1648 (1993) which contains a
balancing of the rights to free commercial speech and privacy. 491 N.W.2d at 883-92.
In Casino Mktg. Group, Justice Coyne favors the latter, partly on the basis of the state's
objective of protecting residential privacy, but with little apparent attention to, or analysis of, a state constitutionalright of privacy as such. Id. at 886-87. The opinion primarily
rejects protection for a form of speech but may be a sleeper, perhaps unintentionally
so, on the issue of privacy.
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for the federal courts it makes no sense to disregard the reasoning that brought them to a given result.
It also makes little sense to attach constricting labels to one's
position on the approach generally. State judges who understand the powers they possess, and the corresponding limits on
them, need only pursue what is most probably the best, fairest
interpretation. As Chief Justice Marshall recognized: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." '
22.
While it is true that the resources available to the United
States Supreme Court, and to the parties and advocates who appear there, are generally more ample than in most cases in lower
courts, there is nothing to prove that justices of that Court are
any wiser, or lawyers any abler, or parties any more deserving, or
issues necessarily any more important. By the same token,
although the genius of the founding fathers remains an accepted notion in American history, even in our cynical times and
assuming its truth, this does not mean that the authors of state
constitutions were any less equal to their tasks. The latter had
the mission and advantage, as do state judges, of being able to
focus upon local conditions, history, and prospects, rather than
having to be concerned always to write for nationwide application. Thus the states may learn from the lessons of federal history and federal law, but they should be neither intimidated by
them nor blinded to their own needs, privileges and
opportunities.
23.
The laboratory of state constitutional development, like any
forum for invention, invites innovation, and although prudence
is naturally indicated, state courts should not be inhibited in
their experimentation. As Justice Holmes observed, "constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some
141.

M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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chances, and in the great majority of instances, no doubt, justice
will be done. 1 4 2
24.
The inbred tendency to worship the federal founders and
their Constitution uncritically should be corrected by the realization that they embraced slavery, 143 and denigrated the equal status of women'
and Native Americans. 45 It matters little
whether institutionalized injustices are attributed to moral shortcomings, or to the radically different tenor of the times. Either
way, these are enormous and indelible defects which undermine
an argument for the absolute force of the United States Constitution, and especially for the "original intent" of the founders.
Even at that time some states were more enlightened, and if
states could and can do better in those important areas, they
could and can do better in others as well.
25.
The sources to which judges may look, and the factors they
may consider, in reaching state constitutional conclusions are
manifold 46 and include: (a) the specific language of the state
constitution;1 47 (b) the comparable language of the Federal
Constitution, if any;1 48 (c) the apparent reasons for any difference; (d) comparable language in other state, or even foreign,
constitutions; 1 49 (e) history of the state constitution,15 0 which in
Minnesota is relatively sparse as compared to the federal or
other states' literature; 15 1 (f) earlier state statutes and deci142. Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911) (citations omitted).
143. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S.

CONSr.

art.

IV, § 2, ci. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. X1V.
144. The nineteenth amendment, assuring women the right to vote, was not
adopted until 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
145. The first fourteen amendments to the Constitution protecting the rights of citizens do not refer to Indian tribes or tribal members. Congress considered the Indian
Bill of Rights as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1991).
146. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (NJ. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring);
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); see generally Fleming & Nordby, supra note
21.
147. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
148. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn. 1985).
149. State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 416, 144 NW. 142, 143 (1913).
150. State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Minn. 1989).
151. See ANDERSON, supra note 25, at 113. The author states:
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sions; 52 (g) differences in the structures of federal or other state
constitutions; 153 (h) conditions or concerns, unusual in or peculiar to the state-including, as we have suggested, geography,
climate, ethnicity, public attitudes, tradition and mores; 154 (i)

what appears to be most in accord with the general principles of
the state constitution, expressed in its preamble-to perpetuate
the blessings of "our civil and religious liberty to ourselves ...
and our posterity;"15 5 and (j) what best gives meaning to the extraordinary and potentially fertile language, not found in the
Federal Constitution, of article I, section 8: "Every person is entifled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive to his person, property or character, and
to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the
laws." "5' 6 It was this mandate the Minnesota
Supreme Court ap57
plied so long ago in Davis v. Pierse.1
26.
It is one of the nice ironies of history that, in the arena of state
constitutional law, the label of "states' rights" attaches more
often to the posture of traditionally liberal civil libertarians than
to the conservative or reactionary schools with whom that term is
usually associated. Slavery, always the great anomaly in our history, all but eternally tainted the notion of states' rights by its
perverse insistence upon the right of state governments to resist
the federal government to the utter detriment of certain innocent individuals, which is now the very reverse of the state constitutional mission.
[I]t is impossible to escape the conclusion that the debates in the two wings of
the Minnesota constitutional convention have for legal purposes far less value
than is ordinarily the case with constitutional debates. It is clear from what the
members of the compromise committee said in reporting their final conclusions to the several conventions, that they worked somewhat independently of
both conventions.
Id.
152. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992).
153. O'Connor v.Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979).
154. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d at 460.
155. MINN. CONST. pmbl.
156. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
157. 7 Minn. 1 (1862); see supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. See also Magna
Carta,Section 40.
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27.
The initial responsibility, and opportunity, for the elaboration
of state constitutional law generally lies not with judges, but with
lawyers, and principally with trial lawyers. Excepting those infrequent occasions where a reviewing court interjects an issue sua
sponte, or where appellate counsel successfully raises a question
for the first time on appeal, law is made at the end of a process
which begins in the lower courts. This process is favored because it allows the most complete debate on an issue, focused
upon the most immediate facts of the particular case.
Reviewing courts may, and often do, refuse to consider questions which have not been decided below. If, however, trial lawyers are providing competent representation, they should be the
first to identify and assert any rights, constitutional or otherwise,
to which their clients are even arguably entitled. The relative
paucity of state constitutional decisions must therefore be attributed to the failures of the trial bar, a failure for which several
reasons may account, two in particular.
First, law schools have traditionally emphasized the federal as
opposed to the state constitution. Until recently the United
States Supreme Court's decisions have virtually monopolized the
field of Constitutional Law; this failure, therefore, is unremarkable. Second, trial lawyers are, for better or worse, often concerned only with the immediate facts and procedural intricacies
of a given case and fail to undertake the innovative conjecture
that is required for development of new constitutional territory.
Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of cases make their
way through the system within the confines of federally settled
constitutional doctrine. Only very slowly has this pattern begun
to change.
Trial lawyers must ask: Is a constitutional question implicated
in a given situation? If so, they must further ask whether it has
been decided under the Federal Constitution. Conversely, if no
such question is implicated, trial lawyers must ask if constitutional doctrine can be extended to meet the present circumstances. Finally, the advocate must inquire whether the state
constitution may provide a different result even though the question has been decided adversely under the Federal Constitution.
In a very real sense, virtually any constitutional right or privilege,
regardless of whether it has gone unrecognized or even been
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rejected by the federal courts, may emerge from a state
constitution.
Because of the traditional predominance of federal pronouncements, the relative ease in simply following them deferentially, and the bar's ignorance of or indifference to the
independent potency of their state constitutions, state courts
have too rarely been invited to fashion autonomous state doctrine. As a result, state decisions too often merely parrot federal
learning. Nonetheless, even where this has occurred it need not
be left to rest. State decisions are more easily overruled than
those of the United States Supreme Court, particularly if new or
more persuasive arguments, sometimes based upon changing
conditions, can be presented.
28.
Lawyers have the exciting opportunity and responsibility for
raising the issues. This responsibility is highest among criminal
defense lawyers who are, or should be, most alert to constitutional nuances and who should be most innovative in the
field. 15 8 Unfortunately, they have been conspicuously absent
from the bench.
State trial judges have the power and the splendid privilege of
deciding these questions in the first instance. They may do so
sua sponte and should be encouraged to interject the state constitution where the parties and counsel have overlooked it and
where it is appropriate to do so. It is not presumptuous to suggest that new state judges should be educated in the intricacies
of state constitution law.
Ultimately, it is the state appellate judges to whom the rare
privilege of making constitutional law falls. One would imagine
this to be the most rewarding of judicial labors. Only a handful
of men and women even attain the positions which carry this
authority. Since these decisions are beyond the authority of federal courts to review,1 59 and beyond the power of the legislature
to impair, they must, of course, be principled. But since the nature of the power itself can only be used to expand constitutional
rights and privileges, they present ordinarily only opportunities
158. See generallyJohn R. Tunheim, CriminalJusticeExpanded ProtectionsUnder the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 465 (1994).
159. See State v. Clausen, 493 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Minn. 1992) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117 (1945)).
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for doing good-except in the eyes of those who see expansion
of personal liberties as evil. One can scarcely conceive of an area
of judicial activity where so much benefit is likely to flow from
innovations involving so little risk of doing harm.
29.
It is important for the issue to be framed and decided specifically and exclusively on state constitutional grounds. If a state
court decision involves an interpretation of federal law, or rests
upon both federal and state constitutional grounds, it is ordinarily reviewable in the federal courts. But if a state court explicitly
decides a question under adequate and independent state constitutional principles the federal courts have no authority to interfere with it-provided, of course, that the decision does not
diminish or conflict with federal constitutional desiderata.
Therefore counsel should urge the court to "make clear by a
plain statement" that any reference to federal law in an opinion
is "only for the purpose of guidance," that those authorities do
not "compel the result that the court has reached," and the decision should indicate "clearly and expressly" that it is based on
"bona fide separate, adequate, and independent" state constitu160
tional grounds.
30.
Justice Brennan, as long ago as 1977, wrote in what should be
taken as an admonition to members of the bar, and certainly an
invitation to state judges: "I suggest to the bar that, although in
the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal
constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional questions."161 Justice Robert Jones of Oregon has gone so far as to
160. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). For an example of a state court
very carefully following this safeguard, see State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988),
where the state declined to find itself bound under the state constitution by the United
States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (creating the so-called "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule).
161. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 489, 502 (1977); see alsoJohn Henry Hingson III, State Constitutions and the CriminalDefense Lauyer: A Necessary Virtue, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1990, at 6.
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suggest that a lawyer who fails to invoke the state constitution
"should be guilty of malpractice."162
The Minnesota lawyer who is also a student of the state constitution should always have in mind at least these facial particulars
in which the state version differs from the Federal Constitution:
(a) the emphasis on religious liberty and the prohibition of the
use of state funds for religious purposes;1 6 3 (b) the several guarantees of trial by jury;1 4 (c) the expansive free speech provision; 16 1 (d) the "rights of conscience" guarantee; 166 (e) the
broader bail provisions;1 67 (f) the plenary guarantee of a remedy
for redress of injuries, including those to "character;" 168 (g) the
insistence upon the right to obtain justice "freely and without
purchase, completely and without denial;" 6 9 (h) the explicit
prohibition upon imprisonment for debt; 70 (i) the subordination of the military power together with the omission of the federal right to bear arms; 171 (j) the exclusion of slavery;1 72 (k) the
preferred place of the Bill of Rights at the outset of the state
constitution, 173 and (1) the emerging right of privacy,1 74 which is
not explicit in either Constitution. These areas represent a cornucopia of potential liberties, but they remain latent until lawyers and judges give them life.
31.
In his poem "The Road Not Taken," Robert Frost speaks of
coming upon two diverging roads in a wood where, after some
reflection:
I took the one less traveled by,
1 75
And that has made all the difference.
162. State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring).
163. See MINN. CONST. pmbl.; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
164. MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4, 6.
165. Id. § 3.
166. Id. § 16.
167. Id. §§ 5, 7.
168. Id. § 8.
169. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
170. Id. § 12.
171. Id. § 13.
172. Id. § 2 (pre-dating the Federal Thirteenth Amendment).
173. Id.
174. See Steenson, supra note 67, at 383.
175. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in MODERN POETRY 114 (Maynard Mack et al.,
eds. 1961).
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These well-known words are often taken as an exhortation to
individuality, and so they are, but in their context they are more
circumscribed than the license for rebellion they are sometimes
taken to be. The two roads in the poem are, in fact, very similar;
the one the speaker takes is only marginally less traveled; and
the speaker reckons he may come back and take the other some
day.

17 6

The enduring potency and wonderful suggestiveness of this little poem resides, in large part at least, in its quietness and even
its ambiguity. The reader is more likely to take that path because he is invited rather than pushed down it, and reassured
that the absence of an unequivocal reason for preference is no
obstacle. Implicitly no great danger lurks at its end. But the
choice makes "all the difference."1 7 7
So in questions of state constitutional law, when we encounter
a fork in the road the better-worn federal path has its immediate
appeal and may seem safer or shorter, (otherwise why would
more travelers have taken it?), but the other tempts the adventurer in us, even the reformer, and so long as we see no insurmountable obstacles along it, we may take it with the
anticipation that particular rewards await. The stakes are not so
high that we need fear disaster, and the choice may make a salutary difference.

176. Frost says:
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.
Id.
177. Id.
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32.
A state constitutional provision or issue may be related to the
Federal Constitution in one of several ways: (a) both constitutions may have identical provisions, as in the search and seizure
sections;1 78 (b) each may have similar language with more or less
unimportant differences, as with freedom of speech; 179 (c) one
may have an identical provision, but additional language on the
point as well, as in the jury trial and bail provisions;18 0 or (d) one
may have language altogether absent from the other, as in Minnesota's redress of injuries or wrongs, and freedom of conscience and religion sections.18 1
Although under the preferable "primary" approach one looks
first to the state document, it is neither realistic nor desirable to
ignore altogether the federal provisions and their construction,
particularly when they are identical or closely similar. By the
same token, however, deference to the Federal Constitution is
obviously impossible where the state provision is entirely different, and the very fact that other areas coincide lends particular
force to the state language when they do not. It therefore becomes important, and is certainly instructive, to place the documents side-by-side, to identify the differences, and thereby to
suggest areas of especial potential in the Minnesota version.
The Federal Bill of Rights 8 2 comprises a series of amendments that follow, physically as well as chronologically, the body
of the Federal Constitution. The Minnesota Bill of Rights is the
first article of the state constitution, suggesting its particular importance. There are naturally many differences between state
and federal provisions relating to the branches and form of government, taxation, and boundaries. Matters of local and public
concern generally involve no conflict between state and federal
provisions. We are here concerned with individual rights, and
our attention is therefore principally to the bills of rights. Following is a comparison of the Minnesota Bill of Rights and the
federal counterparts.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

MINN. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5, 7; U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VIII.
MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 16-17.
U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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We the people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God for
our civil and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its
and our posterity,
blessings and secure the same to ourselves1 83
do ordain and establish this Constitution.
U.S.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and 18
establish
this Constitution for the
4
United States of America.
SEC. 1

-

OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT

MINNESOTA

Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the people, in whom all political power is inherent,
together with the right to alter, modify or reform government
whenever required by the public good.185

U.S.
No similar provision, but compare with preamble, supra and
also with:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others re186
tained by the people.
SEC. 2

- RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

MINNESOTA

No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of
any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,
unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the
state otherwise than as punishment
for a crime of which the
18 7
party has been convicted.

183. MINN. CONST. pmbl.
184. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
185. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also MINN. CONST. pmbl.; MINN. CONST. art. IX
(amending process).
186. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
187. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 188
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place
189
subject to their jurisdiction.
SEC. 3 - LIBERTY OF THE PRESS
MINNESOTA

The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all
persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such
right. 190
U.S.
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ....
SEC. 4 - TRLAiL BY JURY
MINNESOTA

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy. Ajury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases
in the manner prescribed by law. The legislature may provide
that the agreement of five-sixths of a jury in a civil action or
proceeding, after not less than six hours' deliberation, is a
sufficient verdict. The legislature may provide for the
number of jurors in a civil action or proceeding, provided
that ajury have at least six members.1 9 1
U.S.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... 192
188. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
190. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
191. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended pursuant to 1988 MINN. LAws, ch. 716, in
response to State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988)).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States than according to the
19 3
rules of the common law.
SEC. 5. - No EXCESSIVE BAIL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
MINNESOTA

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.1 94
U.S.
Identical with the exception that the "or" is replaced by
"and."195
SEC. 6

- RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

MINNESOTA

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county
or district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law. In all prosecutions of crimes defined by law as
felonies, the accused has the right to ajury of 12 members. In
all other criminal prosecutions, the legislature may provide
for the number ofjurors, provided that ajury have at least six
members. The accused shall enjoy the right to be informed
of the nature and causes of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his
favor and to have the assistance
9 6
of counsel in his defense.'
U.S.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul193. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
194. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. But see MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7, to which no comparable federal counterpart exists. "All persons . . . shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great." Id.
196. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended pursuant to 1988 MINN. LAws, ch. 716, in
response to State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 380 (Minn. 1988)).
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sory process for obtaining witnesses in his 197
favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.' 98
SEC. 7 - DUE PROCESS; PROSECUTIONS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SELFINCRIMINATION; BAIL; HABEAS CORPUS
MINNESOTA

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. All persons before conviction shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is
evident or the presumption great. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless the public safety
1 99
requires it in case of rebellion or invasion.
U.S.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
2 00
use without just compensation.

No State shall .

.

. deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-

erty without due process of law ....

201

The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the
20 2
public safety may require it.
197. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
199. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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- REDRESS OF INJURIES OR WRONGS

MINNESOTA

Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without
purchase, completely and without denial,
promptly and with20
out delay, conformable to the laws.
U.S.
No comparable provision, but compare with:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the... right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and 20to4 petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
SEC. 9 - TREASON DEFINED
MINNESOTA

Treason against the state consists only in levying war against
the state, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and
comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act or on
20 5
confession in open court.
U.S.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
20 6
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption
of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.2 °7
SEC. 10

- UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PROHIBITED

MINNESOTA

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

MINN. CONsT. art. I,
U.S. CONST. amend.
MINN. CONST. art. I,
U.S. CONST. art. III,
U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 8.
I.
§ 9.
§ 3, cl. 1.
§ 3, cl. 2.
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.2 °8
U.S.
Identical.

°9

SEC. 11 - ATTAINDERS, Ex POST FACTO LAWS AND LAws
IMPAIRING CONTRACTS PROHIBITED
MINNESOTA

No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or any law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be passed, and no conviction
2 10
shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
U.S.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 2 "
Law,
No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
2 12
....
Contracts
of
Obligation
the
impairing
Law
or
SEC. 12

- IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT; PROPERTY EXEMPTION

MINNESOTA

No person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state, but this
shall not prevent the legislature from providing for imprisonment, or holding to bail, persons charged with fraud in contracting said debt. A reasonable amount of property shall be
exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or
liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined
by law. Provided, however, that all property so exempted
shall be liable to seizure and sale for any debts incurred to
any person for work done or materials furnished in the construction, repair or improvement of the same, and provided
further, that such liability to seizure and sale shall also extend
to all real property for any debt to any laborer or servant for
labor or service performed.2 13
U.S.
No comparable provision.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

MINN. CONST. art. I, § 9.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Id. § 10, cl. 1.

213.

MINN. CONsr. art. I, § 11.
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- PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE

MINNESOTA

Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for
public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or
secured. 1
U.S.
[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation. 215
SEC.

14

- MILITARY POWER SUBORDINATE

MINNESOTA

The military shall be subordinate to the civil power and no
standing army shall be maintained in this state in times of
peace. 1 6
U.S.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.21 7
SEC. 15 - LANDS ALLODIAL; VOID AGRICULTURAL LEASES
MINNESOTA

All lands within the state are allodial and feudal tenures of
every description with all their incidents are prohibited.
Leases and grants of agricultural lands for a longer period
than 21 years reserving rent or service of any kind shall be
void.218

U.S.
No comparable provision, but compare with: 19
2
No state shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.
SEC. 16

- FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE;

GIVEN TO

ANY

No

PREFERENCE TO BE

RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT OR MODE OF
WORSHIP

MINNESOTA

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. § 13.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
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The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny
or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. The
right of every man to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any
man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of
worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or
mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury
religious societies or religious or theofor the benefit of any
220
logical seminaries.
U.S.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... 221
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.2 22
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constiare reserved to the
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
2 23
States respectively, or to the people.
SEC.

17

- RELIGIOUS TESTS AND PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS
PROHIBITED

MINNESOTA

No religious test or amount of property shall be required as a
qualification for any office of public trust in the state. No
religious test or amount of property shall be required as a
qualification of any voter at any election in this state; nor shall
any person be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any
court of law or equity in consequence of his opinion upon the
subject of religion.2 2 4
U.S.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
220. MINN. CONSr. art. I,
221. U.S. CONST. amend.
222. U.S. CONST. amend.
223. U.S. CONST. amend.
224. MINN. CONST. art. I,

§ 16.
I.
IX.
X.

§ 17.
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States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.2 5

225. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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